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Abstract A theological model of the human is needed to prompt responsible 
thinking about and acting within the physical world. Some basic components 
for modeling the human as a virtuous cooperator appear in the teachings of 
Thomas Aquinas. When appropriated cautiously and informed broadly by 
contemporary scientific findings, this model provides a promising way of 
thinking about humans in relation to other species and ecological systems, a 
framework for acting responsibly, and the motivation for making this behavior 
habitual. 
 
Keywords Aquinas, cooperation, moral virtues, criteria for modeling, 
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Introduction 
 
During this time of widespread ecological degradation, a 
meaningful model of the human is needed to prompt responsible 
thinking about and acting within the physical world. Many models 
exist in the Christian tradition, but few have been explored for their 
application to our ecological age besides imago Dei of Genesis 1,1 
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Teilhard de Chardin’s homo faber,2 the U.S. Catholic Bishops’ preferred 
“co-creator” and “stewards” duo,3 and Philip Hefner’s “created co-
creator.”4 Among alternative models of the human is the virtuous 
cooperator, the basic components of which appear in the teachings of 
Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274 C.E.). When informed by contemporary 
scientific findings, this model provides a promising way of thinking 
theologically about the human in relation to other species and 
ecological systems, a framework for acting responsibly, and the 
motivation for making this behavior habitual. I am grateful for this 
opportunity to bring the virtuous cooperator to the attention of 
scholars. 
 
I begin by identifying the criteria that must be met for modeling 
the human today. An exploration of Aquinas’s notions about 
cooperation and the chief moral virtues follows in which I indicate the 
significance of his teachings for our time and the extensions that are 
needed in order to be more responsive to environmental problems. 
Subsequently, I test the virtuous cooperator against the criteria for 
modeling humans and conclude in favor of this model. 
 
Criteria for Modeling 
 
Several criteria are pertinent to the task of developing a model 
of the human during this ecologically destructive age.5 For a 
theological model, the first and foremost criterion is that it should be 
rooted in a religious faith tradition so it can be recognized, embraced 
with confidence, and applied by people who profess that faith. The 
more deeply embedded the model is in that religion’s primary texts, 
doctrines, and teachings by eminent theologians, the more likely the 
model may appeal to the faithful. 
 
A second criterion for modeling the human for our time is the 
need to be consistent with broad scientific findings about the physical 
world. Theological discourse regarding the human must cohere with 
knowledge gained through other modes of inquiry or run the risk of 
being irrelevant and meaningless. When informed by the 
contemporary sciences, a model of the human will assume that every 
natural being existing today emerged from a common beginning about 
fifteen billion years ago out of which heavy elements like carbon and 
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iron were produced in the interiors of stars. This ensuing process 
enabled the formation of at least one planet with the chemical 
composition, temperature and radiation emission to bring about 
replicating molecules that led eventually to complex and diverse 
beings.6 Among them was at least one species able to reflect on the 
history of its emergence from and with other species and to 
recognize the radical human connection with all living and nonliving 
beings that constitute the universe and especially Earth.7 
 
That the model should be positively relational to other species 
and physical systems is a third criterion. While an understanding of the 
interconnection of humans and other past and present beings surfaces 
when assuring the model’s consistency with contemporary scientific 
findings, a metaphysical understanding of that relationship is also 
crucial. A model of the human for our time must avoid dualistic 
thinking that places humans over or apart from other beings and views 
them merely as instruments to be used for whatever purposes a 
human desires. Conversely, a model for our ecologically endangered 
times must incorporate regard for humans as integral actors with non-
humans in ecological systems, respect for their mutual interests in 
and needs for surviving, valuing of the distinct contributions they 
make to the functioning of ecological systems, and appreciation for the 
dependence humans have on the health and wellbeing of other 
species, the air, the land and water. 
 
A fourth criterion is that the model should outline at least 
broadly the kind of behavior that is needed today. The more 
descriptive the normative language is, the more effective the 
model will be for guiding human actions. 
 
Finally, the model should point to the motivation for bringing 
about a change in the way people who profess a religious faith think 
about and act toward the more-than-human others that constitute 
Earth. This is a pivotal criterion because a model will most likely fail 
unless the ultimate theological reason for bringing about a 
transformation in attitude and behavior is explicit. From my experience 
as a teacher with a past and present in environmental advocacy, 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Worldviews, Vol 7, No. 1 (2003): pg. 171-195. DOI. This article is © Brill Academic Publishers and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Brill Academic Publishers does not grant permission for 
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Brill Academic 
Publishers. 
4 
 
this standard has been crucial for students in environmental ethics 
course at Marquette University and for activists with whom I have 
been working over the past three decades. 
 
Aquinas on Cooperation – Four Types 
 
Informed by a medieval understanding of the world as a 
geocentric organism with fixed species created and ordered 
hierarchically to one another by God,8 Aquinas reflected on the 
cooperation among creatures and their cooperation with God. He used 
variations of cooperator9 to convey four distinct but related types of 
cooperation: (1) Creatures cooperate by acting or being acted 
upon according to their God-given natures for their individual and 
common good in conformity with the orderly world God created and 
sustains in existence;10 (2) living creatures cooperate with God, their 
primary cause for existing, by acting as secondary agents on other 
creatures to carry out God’s plan for the universe;11 (3) God both 
operates on and cooperates with humans for their temporal and 
eternal good;12 and (4) humans cooperate with God’s grace by acting 
on others in ways that achieve good in temporal life as they seek their 
eternal good which is happiness with God.13 Occasionally he referred to 
1 Cor 3.9, 1 Thes 3.2-5, and Rom 8.28 to support his notions. 
 
Inter-Cooperation of Creatures 
 
Aquinas’s teachings that creatures cooperate by acting or being 
acted upon according to their natures reflected his understanding that 
God created all animate and inanimate beings with specific capabilities 
of fulfilling their purposes in relation to one another. From his 
medieval perspective, the ascending order of creatures with some 
material composition consisted of the four primary elements of air, 
earth, water and fire, minerals and other mixed elements, plants, 
irrational animals, and humans (ST 1.47.2).14 Primary elements serve 
as the basic substrata for mixed elements, mixed elements provide 
nourishment for plants, plants provide food for animals, and animals 
as well as plants supply the physical needs of humans. Aquinas 
referred to this arrangement as an order of conservation (SCG 3.22) 
within which creatures cooperate to internally sustain the universe that 
God created and maintains in existence. At least implicitly, this 
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arrangement also constitutes an order of instrumentality in which 
humans use plants and animals, animals use plants, and plants use 
mixed elements for their sustenance.15 He lavished with superlatives 
his descriptions of this orderly universe of cooperators, each of which 
contributes something essential to the perfection of the universe16 and 
all of which cooperate to achieve its internal common good.17 While he 
considered some cooperators qualitatively better than others, primarily 
because of their natures and capacities to act, and thought that 
humans are superior to other material beings, because of the innate 
human capacity to make informed decisions and act freely on them, he 
concluded that the whole universe of cooperators is better than one or 
several types of creatures.18 
 
Of course, Aquinas’s depictions of the physical world’s 
functioning were limited by his knowledge of the world that was 
informed by the natural philosophy of his time. There are no 
inklings in his works about the evolution of species that in turn account 
for the human connection with other species over eons of time, about 
their molecular similarities, or about the complex makeup and 
synergistic effects of abiota and biota within ecological systems. Nor 
did he convey any anticipation that human activities could accelerate 
the extinction of species, destroy habitats, degrade ecological systems, 
or threaten the integrity of the biosphere. Foundational to his 13th 
century thinking was his faith that God created and sustains the 
world’s capacity to maintain itself physically according to natural laws 
God established to assure its functioning.19 
 
Creatures’ Cooperation with God 
 
That living creatures cooperate with God by acting on other 
creatures has its basis in Aquinas’s thinking about God as the primary 
cause of the universe of many diverse entities, including secondary 
causes that act on others according to their natures.20 As the primary 
cause of their existence, God endowed living creatures with capabilities 
of acting on others to achieve their respective purposes as intended by 
God.21 Plants acting on minerals and other mixed elements for their 
nourishment, animals acting on plants for their food, and humans 
acting on plants and animals for their temporal needs are God’s 
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cooperators, by acting instrumentally on others to acquire what they 
need for their sustenance and acting together to maintain the internal 
functioning of the universe.22 By acting on others, secondary actors 
enable those upon which they act to achieve their God-endowed 
purposes for being in the universe. 
 
Secondary agents are also God’s cooperators in a sacramental 
sense by manifesting God’s goodness and wisdom.23 They manifest 
God’s goodness and wisdom as individual types of creatures that 
actively achieve their temporal purposes in relation to others according 
to God’s intentions. However, the best manifestation of God’s 
goodness and wisdom is the functioning of all secondary agents and 
those acted upon as God intends.24 
 
As cooperators among many different cooperators, humans 
cooperate with God by acting freely according to the dictates of reason 
to achieve what is good in their temporal lives that are supposed to be 
geared toward achieving their eternal happiness with God.25 Whereas 
other living creatures operate by instinct in determined patterns 
through principles innate to their species,26 Aquinas reasoned from his 
medieval understanding of the world, humans have the unique ability 
among creatures to act by making informed decisions about how they 
ought to be living in the world and to exercise their free wills in 
deciding whether or not to act accordingly (SCG 3.78; ST 2|2.64.2). 
Their decisions and actions are supposed to be conducive to the quest 
for eternal life in God’s presence.27 
 
Aquinas stressed repeatedly that humans should restrict their 
actions on other creatures to acquiring the necessities of life and 
knowing God as they seek their eternal goal (ST Supp. 91.1).28 When 
acting on other creatures in these two ways that are appropriate to the 
functioning of the universe, humans are God’s cooperators.29 
 
The necessities of life are things humans need to support their 
bodies, such as food, clothing, transportation (ST 2|2.141.6),30 and 
those things without which they cannot carry on their lives in 
appropriate ways as they seek eternal happiness with God (ST 
1|2.4.7).31 He proscribed the exorbitant use of God’s other creatures, 
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describing it as inordinate and wasteful (ST 2|2.83.6), immoderate (ST 
2|2.169.1),32 disordered and vicious (SCG 4.83). The excessive 
use of other entities was judged sinful in the scheme of the human 
quest for eternity with God (ST 2|2.118.1).33 
 
Aquinas’s teachings that humans can use other creatures to 
know God reflect his sacramental perception of the physical world as a 
means through which God’s goodness, wisdom, power and other 
attributes can be contemplated (SCG 2.2).34 This teaching also reflects 
his optimism that humans have been gifted by God with the capacity 
to rise gradually from the world to limited knowledge of God, though 
he expressed his sacramental view of the world in ways less emotive 
than found in works by Augustine, Hugh of St. Victor, Bonaventure and 
Francis of Assisi.35 Physical beings can lead humans to God, Aquinas 
contended, referring occasionally to Rom 1:20 and Wis 13, as long as 
they start from their faith perspective that the 
world is God’s creation and approach it as a means of knowing and 
loving God (ST 1.65.1).36 
 
That humans often fail to be cooperative concerned Aquinas. 
Whereas other living and nonliving beings do not deviate from God’s 
intentions, defective behavior occurs extensively among humans (ST 
1.49.3). Their behavior is defective when they do not orient their 
actions toward their temporal common good (ST 1|2.109.3),37 with a 
view to their eternal good—God (ST 1.49.1-3).38 For Aquinas, the 
more comprehensive the good envisaged by the human, the more the 
human will corresponds to the will of God who wills the good of the 
orderly universe (ST 1|2.19.10),39 and loves it with the highest kind of 
love (DC 7).40 To show humans how to live a God-centered life, God 
became incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ (ST 3.1-5). 
 
God’s Grace Operating on and Cooperating with 
Humans 
 
To help individuals make and act on decisions to acquire 
temporal goods in ways that cohere with the quest for eternal 
happiness, God provides special care to individuals by giving them 
grace (ST 1.22.2).41 God’s grace both operates on and cooperates with 
humans toward their ultimate goal (DV 24.11, 27.5) without 
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interfering in the human exercise of making and carrying out their 
decisions freely.42 God’s grace operates lovingly on the human, 
working on the human spirit to think about and act in ways that are 
conducive to achieving eternal life (ST 1|2.110.1). God’s grace 
cooperates with the human by actively sustaining the innate human 
capacity to make informed decisions and to choose to act accordingly. 
God’s grace also operates on and cooperates with humans to develop 
moral virtues that will aid them in exercising their wills appropriately in 
this life because they are motivated to achieve eternal life with God.43 
 
Human Cooperation with God’s Grace–Living Virtuously 
 
According to Aquinas, God created humans with the potential for 
developing moral virtues that will assist them in acting appropriately 
as God intends (ST 1|2.63.1).44 Prudence, justice, temperance and 
fortitude are the chief moral virtues about which he wrote and from 
which he identified an extensive system of virtues motivated by the 
theological virtue of love for God and desire to enjoy eternal happiness 
with God.45 The moral virtues are innate to the individual potentially 
(ST 1|2.58.1).46 Like seeds in the ground, they are naturally present in 
the human reason and must be cultivated (ST 1|2.63.1).47 Humans 
cooperate with God’s grace by developing the virtues in themselves. 
Once perfected, they confer an aptness to act correctly without 
hesitation (ST 1|2.56.3).48 
 
The Virtuous Cooperator 
 
Aquinas taught that humans should be guided by the virtues 
when acting on other creatures (SCG 1.92), since the moral virtues 
incline them to follow informed decisions about relating to one another 
and to other entities that constitute the orderly universe.49 Prudence 
provides the rationale for acting on other living and nonliving beings in 
appropriate ways (ST 1|2.57.4-6),50 while justice, temperance and 
fortitude incline the human to act according to what prudence dictates. 
These four virtues and their sub-virtues have significance for living 
responsibly in our age of ecological degradation. 
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Acting Prudently 
 
Prudence is the habit of being discreet, Aquinas taught (ST 
1|2.61.2). A prudent person chooses means of acting on other living 
and nonliving beings through a process of taking counsel, forming a 
good judgment, and commanding correctly (ST 1|2.65.1).51 Taking 
counsel is an act of inquiry aimed at discovering the appropriate 
means toward achieving a goal (ST 1|2.14.1, 57.6).52 Both the private 
good of the individual and the common good of groups to which the 
individual belongs are considered when seeking counsel. The good of 
the individual is impossible, Aquinas argued, unless the common good 
of others is assured (ST 2|2.47.10). Thus, the prudent individual 
considers what is good for one’s self by being prudent about what is 
good for many (ST 2|2.47.10).53 In the process of taking counsel from 
informed sources, the human discerns what is needed to sustain one's 
life, the life of one's neighbor, and the community to 
which the person belongs. Judgment is made subsequently on the 
means most applicable for acting on other beings for the purpose of 
acquiring what is needed for human sustenance (ST 2|2.47.8, 
1|2.57.6). Command, the chief and final act in prudent decision-
making, requires three considerations that have special significance for 
environmental ethics today: foresight, circumspection and caution (ST 
2|2.47.8).54 Foresight assures that what is commanded in the present 
is fitting for the future (ST 2|2.49.6, 55.7). Circumspection facilitates 
the choice of suitable means to an end in light of a combination of 
circumstances that may arise (ST 2|2.49.7). Caution is required to 
avoid evil through a firm understanding of good (ST 2|2.49.8). 
 
While this stepwise exercise of prudence does not absolutely 
assure that the action chosen will be successful for the reasons 
intended, Aquinas explained, the habit of making prudent decisions 
lessens the uncertainty of the outcome (ST 2|2.49.5). To habitually 
choose correct means of acting requires the development of this virtue 
through instruction and experience over a long period of time (SCG 
3.122).55 This framework for the exercise of prudence suggests a 
systematic approach to addressing environmental problems that is 
theologically motivated by the desire to cooperate with God. 
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Acting with Moderation 
 
The virtue of temperance inclines the human to act according to 
what prudence dictates by curbing irrational desires and passions for 
bodily pleasures and material goods things that are contrary to reason 
(ST 1|2.65.1, 60.5).56 Since God intended that they serve as means 
for sustaining human life while ultimately seeking eternal happiness 
with God, the individual should not take excessive pleasure in them for 
themselves or they will distract the individual from spiritual things that 
lead to God (ST 2|2.141.5-6). These temporal needs fall into two 
classifications according to Aquinas: (1) things without which humans 
as individuals and as a species cannot survive; and, (2) things without 
which humans cannot carry on their lives in appropriate ways (ST 
2|2.141.6). While bodily survival needs can be ascertained from 
Aquinas’s works and fits well with his overall notion of the consumptive 
order of creatures that sustains them and the internal functioning of 
the universe, exactly what he meant by things beyond these 
necessities is somewhat obscure. They go beyond purely physical 
requirements and extend to the ownership of external things, including 
a moderate amount of material wealth that is determined when 
considering the place, time and manners of those with whom the 
person lives (ST 2|2.141.6). 
 
In light of Aquinas’s emphasis on the virtue of temperance as a 
guide toward controlling the desire for material goods, excessive 
standards of living would seem to be precluded in any setting to avoid 
deflecting attention from the ultimate desire for eternal happiness with 
God. He endorsed poverty cautiously and restrictively, since he 
thought it an extraordinary way of perfecting one’s life as a Christian. 
He also insisted that a person who adopts poverty should retain the 
ability to secure the necessities of life in a lawful manner.57 
 
Acting Justly 
 
The virtue of justice inclines the human to relate to living and 
nonliving entities in ways that are conducive to achieving the temporal 
common good of humans (ST 2|2.61.2, 58.5) as they seek their 
ultimate end in God. All members of a community stand in relation to 
it as parts to the whole, he taught repeatedly, and the good of the 
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individual should be directed to the common good of the community 
(ST 2|2.58.5-9, 1|2.19.10). Because the community’s temporal good 
is to have sufficient means through which its members can sustain 
their lives, the human would be inclined by the virtue of justice to use 
living and nonliving beings in ways that assure their availability to 
meet the needs of all humans in that community. An individual who 
possesses or desires to possess immoderate amounts of material 
goods sins against another, since one individual cannot have an 
abundance of external riches without other individuals lacking them 
(ST 2|2.118.1). 
 
Since Aquinas considered humans as members of various kinds 
of communities--households, states and the universe (DP 5.6), his 
thinking provides an opening for construing the virtue of justice as 
inclining humans to use goods of the Earth in ways that assure their 
availability to meet the needs of other humans now and into the 
future. Furthermore, because the common good of the human 
community would be jeopardized by the degradation of the air, land 
and water, the accelerated rate of species extinction, the destruction 
of habitats, and damage to the biosphere,58 possibilities of which 
Aquinas was evidently unaware, the virtue of justice could be 
construed today as inclining humans individually and collectively to 
relate to other biota and abiota in ways that do not jeopardize the 
functioning of natural systems in the interests of human communities 
near and far, now and into the future. 
 
An even more expansive and ecologically sensitive role for 
justice is suggested from Aquinas’s teaching that the more 
comprehensive the good envisaged by the human, the more the 
human will corresponds to the will of God who wills the good of the 
whole universe (ST 1|2.19.10).59 God is the exemplar for humans to 
follow by acting in ways that are geared toward the good of all natural 
entities (SCG 3.24, 2.45-46). As creatures endowed with intellectual 
capacities to discern appropriate actions and to choose to act 
accordingly, humans would be inclined by the virtue of justice to act 
for the common good of the entire corporeal world. Of course, because 
the human is, according to Aquinas, the end of all corporeal things in 
the orderly universe, acting primarily in the interest of the common 
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good of the universe would concurrently be acting in the interests of 
the human species. 
 
As one of two particular types of justice, commutative justice 
would incline humans individually and collectively to give to another 
the temporal goods that are due to that individual (ST 2|2.61.1, 4). 
Among these permissible goods is personal property, but only to the 
extent that it enables the individual to meet life's needs and is cared 
for in ways that make it possible to aid others who do not have 
sufficient goods with which to meet their needs (ST 2|2.58.1). 
Distributive justice directs the community to assure that the individual 
receives a fair share of the common goods of the community that is 
proportionate to the importance of the individual's position in that 
community (ST 2|2.61.1, 63.2). Receiving a fair share of the 
community's common goods assures that the individual has sufficient 
goods with which to live a virtuous life as part of the community, but 
not at the expense of meeting the needs of others in that community. 
Both types of justice provide a basis for collective action aimed at 
assuring that human needs are met now and into the future. Meeting 
these needs would be dependent upon maintaining the availability of 
natural goods upon which humans rely for their sustenance. 
 
Explicit extensions of Aquinas’s teachings on the virtue of 
general justice and the two particular types of justice are warranted 
today in light of contemporary scientific findings about the human 
place in the cosmological-biological continuum and the human 
dependence on other than humans for sustenance. Justice should be 
accorded generally to other species, ecological systems, and the 
biosphere of Earth as essential parts of the community of the universe 
whose interests in sustainable functioning should be considered. 
Explicit extensions of the distributive and commutative forms of justice 
are also needed to assure that humans recognize and respect the 
needs of other cooperators and avoid actions that impede them from 
satisfying their needs. 
 
Acting Steadfastly Courageous 
 
The virtue of fortitude enables the individual to persevere in 
relating appropriately to other living and nonliving entities despite 
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impediments that weaken the individual’s virtuous cooperation with 
them (ST 2|2.123.2-3).60 Fortitude reinforces justice to incline humans 
individually and collectively to seek the good of other humans now and 
into the future. Fortitude supports temperance so it inclines humans to 
use other corporeal things for the necessities of life and to know God 
rather than for pure pleasure or pride of ownership (ST 1|2.68.4). 
Fortitude strengthens prudence to persist in inclining humans in their 
efforts to discern the best ways of relating to other living and nonliving 
entities that constitute Earth. 
 
Fortitude can be appropriated today as the virtue that will 
strengthen humans individually and collectively to persist in using the 
goods of Earth minimally with a view to the internal sustainability of 
ecological systems and the biosphere. This is an especially important 
point to stress among the middle-income to affluent faithful in both 
industrially developed and developing countries. Though Aquinas 
considered this virtue to incline humans to be steadfast, despite fear 
and other passions that may impede their acting according to the 
dictates of prudence (ST 1|2.61.2), fortitude could also be construed 
today as fortifying human resolve to take protective and remedial 
actions for fear of real or potential adverse effects that human actions 
cause on other species, their habitats, and ecological systems. 
 
Meeting the Modeling Criteria 
 
Does the virtuous cooperator meet the five criteria that are 
essential to model the human during our age of ecological 
degradation? Many advantages surface to make this model promising 
for people who profess their faith in God. 
 
Rooted in the Tradition 
 
While thinking about the human as a virtuous cooperator is 
rooted in the Christian faith through efforts of one of its most eminent 
theologians, this model has languished for centuries and needs airing 
for consideration by the faithful today. Finding the components of this 
model in Aquinas’s thinking should command the attention of many 
within the Christian and other traditions who have inherited or at least 
respect his synthesis of Judeo-Christian thinking with the best of Greek 
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philosophy. His appeal may be especially strong for Roman Catholics 
because he is revered as a “Doctor of the Universal Church”, a saint 
who may have been the first person canonized for being a theologian 
and teacher (Pieper 1962: 17), a scholar and priest whose methods, 
doctrines and principles were required by the Codex Juris Canonica to 
be taught to candidates for the priesthood (Pieper 1962: 18), and a 
profound thinker who stimulated numerous strains of systematic 
theology. As Karl Rahner (1983: 7), one of the great Roman 
Catholic theologians of the twentieth century, remarked about 
Aquinas's overall appeal: 
 
I believe that even today Thomas still remains, in a quite special 
and unique sense, a theologian of such magnitude that he must 
not cease to have a place in our discussions. 
 
His notions about the human as a virtuous cooperator should be 
considered when searching for a meaningful and relevant way to 
respond to the ongoing degradation of God’s creation. 
 
Support from the Catholic tradition for thinking about humans 
as cooperating with God’s grace can also be found in the theological 
conclusions of the Council of Trent (1545-1563). In the context of the 
Reformation and Martin Luther’s teachings about justification by faith 
alone, the Council (1941: 31-34) explained the need for individuals to 
consent to and cooperate with God’s grace in the process of seeking 
eternal salvation. More recent support comes from Pope John Paul II 
(1991: #59) who laments the failure of humans to cooperate with 
God’s grace61 and urges their collaboration to avoid development 
strategies that fail to respect other beings or jeopardize the planet’s 
integrity (1991: #37).62 
 
Retrieving the virtuous cooperator model from Aquinas’s 
teachings also provides the advantage of distinguishing between God’s 
activity and human activity, a criticism leveled against the “co-creator” 
model.63 For the monotheistic traditions, the use of terminology to 
exemplify how we ought to act must avoid confusing or misleading the 
faithful. 
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Consistent with Contemporary Scientific Findings 
 
While Aquinas’s understanding of the physical world differs 
vastly from ours, there is some resonance between his metaphysical 
thinking about humans as cooperators among many other cooperators 
that internally sustain the physical world with ecologists' findings about 
the cooperative interactions of the air, land, water and living beings 
that sustain ecological systems. So, too, does his hierarchical thinking 
about humans as cooperators among various cooperators who act on 
others for their sustenance cohere generally with scientific 
observations about the food chain.64 Some consistency may also be 
found between contemporary scientific findings about the intellectual 
capacity of the human and Aquinas’s understanding of the human as a 
rational cooperator who can contemplate various courses of action, 
make informed decisions, and choose among them. 
 
Of course, his 13th century works do not convey, nor should 
they be expected to, any inkling of scientific evidence obtained 
centuries later that the human species emerged out of and with other 
species in a cosmological-biological continuum, that the DNA 
compositions of humans and other species account in part for affinities 
and disparities in their actions, or that the interconnections and 
interdependencies of species, the air, land and water are highly 
complex ecological systems of which they are parts. However, his faith 
perspective that God created and sustains in existence the internally 
self-maintaining world does not conflict with these contemporary 
scientific findings,65 though his metaphysical framework for thinking 
about species as “fixed” from the beginning of time is inappropriate for 
our time. 
 
Modeling the human as a virtuous cooperator is also consistent 
with ongoing discussions about the sustainability of the planet among 
natural and social scientists and leaders of nations and non-
governmental organizations. They have been striving for two decades 
to define sustainable development in order to identify realistic ways in 
which Earth’s dynamic physical systems can be sustained while 
developing countries strive to industrialize their economies and 
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industrialized countries continue to advance their economic wealth.66 
How humans ought to use other species, the air, land and water is 
crucial to this discussion.  
 
Positive Relationship to Other Species and Physical 
Systems 
 
The virtuous cooperator developed from Aquinas’s thinking is 
positively relational to other species, their habitats and ecological 
systems. Grounded physically in the mutual needs of all beings to 
sustain themselves and thereby sustain the functioning of ecological 
systems and the biosphere, the virtuous cooperator will assume a 
posture of humility before other-than-humans for the late arrival of the 
human species in the unfolding universe, the dependence humans 
have on other beings for human health and well-being, the havoc that 
humans have caused to other species and ecological systems, and the 
technological power with which humans are equipped to destroy Earth. 
The virtuous cooperator will aim to manage human activities so they 
are not degrading or destructive of other species, their habitats, 
ecological systems or the biosphere, recognizing that they are capable 
of managing themselves.67 The virtuous cooperator will view other 
beings as cooperators essential to the functioning of systems of which 
they are parts. The virtuous cooperator will be concerned about the 
interests that other species, habitats, ecological systems and the 
biosphere have for surviving and strive to avoid impeding their efforts. 
 
Virtuous cooperators will be eco-centric in their daily activities 
because they are centered on God who created, sustains and beckons 
forth the further unfolding of the universe. Virtuous cooperators will 
also appreciate their distinctive capabilities in relation to other 
cooperators and accept responsibility for functioning in relation to 
them in ways that are conducive to their well-being. 
 
In addition to this positive relational attitude toward other 
species and physical systems, the virtuous cooperator model provides 
a unique aesthetic dimension. Clothed in a sacramental sensitivity 
toward the physical world that Aquinas shared with other theologians 
before, during and after his time, the virtuous cooperator will be 
inclined to revere other humans, members of other species, their 
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habitats, and the fragile biosphere. They will not be considered sacred 
in themselves, however, as held by some world religions. Instead, the 
virtuous cooperator will relate reverently to other physical beings 
because they mediate God’s presence and character. 
 
Descriptive Behavior 
 
The virtuous cooperator model provides the framework for 
behavior that is needed during this age of ecological degradation. 
Being habitually prudent, just, moderate and courageous are the 
basic behavioral characteristics of the virtuous cooperator. Each virtue 
should be encouraged in young children and developed by the 
individual until virtuous behavior becomes consistently characteristic of 
that person. Individual cooperators should be cognizant of the need to 
cooperate with one another to bring about collective virtuous activity 
at appropriate levels of communities to which they belong–family, 
neighborhood, municipality, county, state, federal and international, 
not remanding to the next collective level what can be accomplished 
on a more local level in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity.68 
 
Guided by the virtue of prudence, the virtuous cooperator will 
make informed decisions and act accordingly in relation to individuals 
of other species, the air, the land and bodies of water in their mutual 
interests of sustaining themselves, sustaining the dynamic functioning 
of the ecosystems of which they are parts, and maintaining the 
integrity of Earth. The virtuous cooperator will apply a stepwise 
process of discovering the best possible courses of action based on the 
data that are available, choosing one that is compatible with the well-
being of all affected in the present and future, and enacting that 
decision cautiously when considering the circumstances and 
contingencies that could arise. The virtuous cooperator will be open to 
appropriating and applying the “precautionary principle” that was 
adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in 1992 and calls upon governments to institute 
protective measures even when a definitive cause-effect relationship 
on a problem has not been identified.69 
 
The virtuous cooperator will be guided by the virtue of 
temperance to limit the use of other species and abiota to the 
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necessities of life, cognizant of their needs for flourishing as essential, 
interacting components of ecological systems. The virtuous cooperator 
will concurrently approach them as means through which God’s 
presence can be experienced and God’s character can be 
contemplated. From this sacramental perspective, the virtuous 
cooperator will encounter individuals of other species, their habitats, 
and vistas of land, sea and sky cautiously to avoid degrading their 
capacities to mediate God, endeavor to preserve species and ecological 
systems so they continue to mediate God’s presence and character in 
the future, react with restraint when individuals of other species 
threaten the health, domicile and of humans, and work to enable the 
identification and implementation of rationales for relating to ecological 
systems and the larger biosphere so their harmonious functioning can 
reflect God’s empowering character. 
 
Informed by the natural sciences and particularly by 
evolutionary biology and ecology, virtuous cooperators will extend 
Aquinas’s initial model to include a sub-virtue of temperance--humility 
(ST 2|2.161.1, 6) toward other-than-humans. Incorporating humility 
into a model of the human is essential to recognize that humans had 
their bodily possibilities begun in the furnaces of stars, emerged from 
and with other entities in the cosmological-biological continuum, and 
are radically dependent upon other types of animate and inanimate 
beings for their bodily wellbeing.  
 
Guided by the virtue of justice, the virtuous cooperator will use 
the goods of Earth in ways that strive to assure their availability to 
meet the needs of other humans near and far, now and into the 
future. The needs of the most vulnerable and politically powerless will 
be met. Non-renewable sources will not be depleted by some at the 
expense of others. The functioning of natural systems will not be 
degraded or destroyed in order to avoid adverse effects on others 
in the present or future. Personal property will be managed in ways 
that make it possible to aid others who do not have sufficient goods 
with which to meet their needs in life. 
 
The virtuous cooperator will also be open to extending Aquinas’s 
notion of justice from acting justly toward other humans within the 
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human community to acting justly toward all biota, recognizing their 
needs for sustaining themselves within their habitats, and toward all 
components of ecosystems so their functioning is not disrupted by 
human activities. The virtuous cooperator will work with other virtuous 
cooperators at social, economic and political levels, following the 
principle of subsidiarity, to bring about justice for all species and 
ecological systems. 
 
Finally, fortitude will guide the virtuous cooperator to be 
steadfastly prudent, temperate and just when relating to other species 
and ecological systems, despite fatigue, cynicism, failure to bring 
about immediate change, and social rebuffs when deviating from self-
centered societal values. The virtuous cooperator will also be propelled 
to stand firm in opposing the loss of biodiversity, the degradation and 
destruction of ecosystems, and damage to the ozone layer due 
to fear of present and future consequences. 
 
Identification of Religious Motivation 
 
Because the motivation behind acting virtuously in this life is 
love for God and the desire to spend eternal happiness in God’s 
presence, the virtuous cooperator meets the final criterion for 
modeling the human in our ecologically endangered age. Those who 
profess faith in God, believe in the promise of everlasting happiness 
with God, and want to gear their lives accordingly are offered a 
compelling model. Appropriated from Aquinas’s works and extended 
to reflect contemporary scientific findings about the world, this model 
explains why humans should act prudently, justly and moderately with 
firm resolve. Modeling the human as a virtuous cooperator makes this 
ultimate reward explicit. 
 
Moreover, this model of the human provides assurance that 
individuals will be able to become virtuous cooperators. In Aquinas’s 
thinking, God offers humans the grace they need to develop the moral 
virtues until their aptness to act steadfastly with prudence, justice and 
moderation is habitual. God provides this supernatural aid out of love 
for humans and for the whole world that God loves with the highest 
kind of love. God’s grace operates on humans to facilitate their resolve 
to live in ways that are geared ultimately toward their goal of 
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everlasting happiness in God’s presence. The grace of God also 
cooperates with humans so that they use their capabilities to the 
fullest extent to develop virtuous behavior toward the more-than-
human beings that constitute God’s Earth. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Aquinas’s teachings about cooperation and the chief moral 
virtues provide some basic components for constructing the virtuous 
cooperator as a model for the human that is needed during our 
ecologically endangered age. When appropriated within an 
evolutionary view of the world and informed by contemporary scientific 
findings, the virtuous cooperator meets the five criteria posited for 
modeling the human today. The virtuous cooperator is rooted in the 
Christian faith tradition with special significance for Roman Catholics 
and others who respect Thomas Aquinas’s synthesis of Judeo-
Christianity and Greek philosophy. The virtuous cooperator coheres 
with broad scientific findings about the physical world when 
acknowledging the cooperative interactions of diverse biota and abiota 
that constitute ecological systems, the food chain through which 
species feed hierarchically on one another to sustain themselves, and 
human place in the biological-cosmological continuum. The virtuous 
cooperator is positively relational to other species and physical 
systems by positing humans as integral actors within ecological 
systems, rather than over or apart from them, and by celebrating the 
unique human capacities to identify, reflect upon and choose to 
implement options for acting responsibly on other-than humans. The 
virtuous cooperator outlines the kind of human behavior that is helpful 
today by acting prudently through a stepwise process of making 
informed decisions, using other goods of Earth moderately for actual 
needs and for thinking about God, acting justly by considering the 
needs of other humans now and into the future and assuring that their 
needs are met within the context of achieving the common good of all 
beings, and remaining steadfast about living virtuously despite fears of 
social pressures and in light of fears of ecological destruction that will 
affect humans now or in the future. Finally, the virtuous cooperator 
stipulates the religious motivation for acting virtuously in relation to 
more-than-humans, a motivation that is no less than love for God and 
desire to spend eternity in God’s presence. 
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While this model needs further refinement, especially to extend 
the notion of justice to more-than-human species, ecological systems 
and the biosphere, the virtuous cooperator warrants consideration 
among others that have been proffered. I welcome comparisons of the 
virtuous cooperator with the imago Dei, homo faber, “co-creator”, 
“steward”, and “created cocreator” models. I also encourage the 
retrieval of other models from the Christian tradition so all promising 
possibilities are available for the faithful to consider and embrace 
during our age of ecological degradation. 
 
Notes 
 
1Among the most notable efforts to define imago Dei as recorded in Genesis 1 
and to make the model meaningful and relevant for our ecological age 
are Hall’s (1986) and Gunton’s (1991: 47-61). 
2Problems with the homo faber model in an age of technological abuse are 
identified perceptively by several scholars, including Teilhardian 
specialist Berry (1982) and moral theologian French (1990). 
3On “co-creator” and “steward” models juxtaposed, see the United States 
Catholic Conference (1991) and Ashley (1985). For reactions to the co-
creator model as appropriated by some authors from Pope John Paul 
II’s early writings, the essays in Houck and Williams (1983) are 
helpful. Among the many explorations of the “steward” model, Hall’s 
(1987, 1990) is especially well grounded and developed. 
4Hefner (1993) developed this impressive model to distinguish human from 
divine activity. 
5These criteria parallel roughly Barbour’s (1997: 113 and 158-9) criteria for 
assessing scientific theories and expressions of religious faith and 
Rausch’s (1993: 19-20) criteria for theological statements. 
6See Polkinghorne’s (1987: 56) synopsis. 
7McFague (1993: 27) summarizes poignantly our “common creation story” 
with all beings: “At some level and in a remote or intimate way, 
everything is related to everything else. We are distant relatives to the 
stars and kissing cousins with the oceans, plants, and other creatures 
on the earth.” 
8For example, see SummaeTheologiae (hereafter cited as ST) 1.47.2, 76.3, 
and Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter SCG) 2.68 and 3.71. Aquinas 
reasoned from his faith perspective that God created and ordered the 
many diverse, essential and valuable types of beings to one another 
because they are ordered ultimately to God, an arrangement that he 
described in De Veritatis (hereafter DV) 5.1 and 3 as a two-fold order 
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of beings. Also see De Potentia (hereafter DP) 3.7.9, ST 1.21.1, SCG 
3.112, Compendium Theologiae (hereafter CT) 148, and Wright’s 
(1957: 30-113) insightful exploration. 
9The Index Thomisticus identifies 286 entries of these usages of cooperator: 
20 regarding the cooperation of creatures; 106 on their cooperation 
with God; 45 in which humans cooperate freely with God or God’s 
grace; and, 115 on divine grace operating on humans and cooperating 
with human actions. 
10See, for example, ST 1.61.3, 111.2, 1|2.9.1 and 19.10, DV 9.2 and 27.5, CT 
124, and SCG 1.70, 3.21 and 69-70. 
11When God works through secondary causal agents, Aquinas taught in ST 
1.105.5, for example, the innate efficacy of their causal powers is left 
absolutely intact. God's activity in them does not displace or obviate 
their actions; it sustains and guides their actions lovingly toward their 
ultimate end. Aquinas perceived God's employing secondary causes to 
govern other creatures as a way of communicating the dignity of 
causality to creatures as indicated, for example, in ST 1.23.8 and 
explained by Gilson (1956: 184). In SCG 3.21, Aquinas cites (pseudo) 
Dionysius and 1 Cor 3.9 to support his thinking that creatures 
operating on others according to the innate characteristics given to 
them by God are Dei cooperatorem. 
12For example, see DV 27.5. Also see ST 1.105.4-5 for Aquinas’s 
understanding of God’s will acting on rational creatures. 
13According to Aquinas in DV 24.11 and 27.5, God offers grace to humans to 
enable their cooperation with God’s intention that they seek the 
temporal good in this life while aiming for eternal happiness. 
14Also see SCG 2.68 where Aquinas graded creatures according to their 
operations or capacities for acting, beginning with inanimate elements 
followed by mixed bodies, and the animate souls of plants, irrational 
animals, and rational animals. In ST 1.48.2, he graded creatures 
according to their incorruptible to corruptible properties as heavenly 
bodies, angels, humans, animals, plants, minerals and mixed bodies, 
and the primary elements; see also ST Supp. 91.5 and SCG 3.71. 
Occasionally he described them metaphorically as a ladder of forms 
(e.g., SCG 2.68). 
15Blanchette (1992: 256) recognizes in Aquinas’s work an order of 
instrumentality among corporeal beings. However, Aquinas’s thinking 
seems more expansive and inclusive of the totality of reality since he 
also considered God’s providential actions as somewhat instrumental 
when moving beings toward their end in God (e.g., SCG 3.100 and DP 
3.7, 5.9) and humans’ using one another (e.g., SCG 3.128, ST 1.96.4 
and 2|2.47.10). See Weisheipl (1974: 206). 
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16In SCG 2.39 and 44, Aquinas described this orderly arrangement as the 
greatest good of the universe, in ST 1.15.2 as its highest good, in SCG 
2.45 and CT 102 as the ultimate and noblest perfection, and in SCG 
3.71 as the highest beauty. Wright (1957: 87) summarizes Aquinas’s 
thinking about the universe as “God’s masterpiece”. Also see 
Blanchette’s (1992) indispensable philosophical analysis of Aquinas’s 
thinking about the perfection of the universe. 
17The common good of the universe is its integrity, which results from the 
order and composition of all its parts, Aquinas explained in SCG 3.94; 
see further DP 1.6.1 and ST 1.115.3. 
18For example, see SCG 1.85, DP 1.6.1 and ST 1.103.7. 
19As Copleston (1955: 142) explained, Aquinas believed that every finite 
entity depends existentially on God at every moment of its existence; 
if the divine conserving or sustaining activity were withdrawn, it would 
immediately cease to exist. 
20For example, see Aquinas’s discussions in ST 1.105.5, SCG 3.67 and DP 3.7. 
21For example, see ST 1.44.3-4 and 47.1 and SCG 3.16-20. For his 
understanding of God’s primary activity and creatures secondary 
causality, see SCG 3.17, CT 103 and 123-124. In SCG 3.69, he 
described the actions of secondary agents as a likeness to God who 
communicates goodness to creatures, and he taught in CT 124, for 
example, that goodness proliferates in the universe when the more 
richly endowed creature cooperates to procure the good of many. 
22Aquinas taught in ST 1.61.3, SCG 1.70 and 3.69 that the interactions of 
creatures in the orderly universe benefit the entire universe. 
23For example, see ST 1.65.2 and SCG 2.45. 
24For example, see ST 1.47.1, SCG 2.45, and DP 3.16. 
25For example, see ST 1|2.3.6-8 and 1|2.180.4. See further SCG 4.55 on 
Aquinas’s teachings that the ultimate end of humans is their eternal 
union with God, a union that is enabled by God’s incarnation, death 
and resurrection in the person of Jesus the Christ. 
26For example, see CT 74, 127 and 148, SCG 3.7 and 111-12, and ST 1.96.1. 
27For example, see SCG 1.92, 3.17-25 and 145, ST 2|2.118.1 and CT 173. 
28Also see ST 1|2.4.6-7, 114.10, 2|2.76.2, 83.6 and 118.1, SCG 3.22, and CT 
173. 
29Aquinas considered the human use of other creatures for the necessities of 
life and knowing God as an exercise of natural dominion; see, for 
example, ST 2|2.66.1-2, CT 74, 127 and 148, SCG 3.78 and 111-112. 
In ST 2|2.66.1, he insisted that God retains absolute dominion over 
both users and used. 
30See also ST Supp. 91.1, 2|2.64.1 and 83.6, and SCG 3.22, 121, 129 and 
131. The prescription that humans are intended to use only what is 
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needed to sustain human life and not what is desired beyond the 
necessities of life resounds throughout his works. 
31Also see ST 2|2.83.6, 118.1 and 141.6. 
32For his understanding of the appropriate use of things by humans, see SCG 
3.129. Some uses for the necessities of life are naturally fitting, he 
taught, whereas as immoderate uses are naturally unfitting in the 
scheme of the integrity of the universe and, ultimately, in the human 
quest for God. 
33See further ST 2|2.83.6 and SCG 4.83. 
34The sacramental quality of the world was explored frequently in patristic and 
medieval theological discourse as indicated by Schaefer (2001: 37-
90). 
35For example, see SCG 4.1, 3.47, ST 1.65.l and 2|2.180.4. 
36See further ST 2|2.180.4 and Supp. 91.1. 
37See further ST 1|2.77.4 and 87.3, SCG 3.6 and 9, DP 3.6, and DV 24.11. 
38Also see ST 1|2.19.10 and 87.3, SCG 3.6 and 9, De malo (hereafter DM) 
1.1, and DP 3.6. 
39Also see SCG 3.94, DP 1.6.1, and ST 1.115.3. 
40See De Caritate (hereafter DC) 7 where Aquinas taught that God loves the 
orderly universe through which all creatures are ordered ultimately to 
God more than God loves the human or any other type of creature. In 
SCG 3.64, he explained that, among created beings, God cares most 
for the order of things established in relation to one another to 
constitute the universe. 
41Also see SCG 3.112-13 and DV 1.5.6-7. According to Aquinas, God’s special 
care is needed for individual humans who have the capacity to think 
about how to act and to choose to act, capacities that humans often 
misuse. This special divine care for individual humans contrasts with 
God’s general care for other species because they do not have 
intellectual capabilities or free will with which to deviate from God’s 
intentions. God’s care for individual humans and other species should 
be considered in relation to Aquinas’s teaching in SCG 3.64 that 
among God’s creation God cares most for the order of all things that 
constitute the universe. 
42This follows his rationale that God governs all things to their end through 
God’s eternal law, which God imposed on the universe in the form of 
natural law; see, for example, ST 1|2.91.1, 93.1-5, and DV 5.1.6. On 
his thinking about rational creatures who are ruled by eternal law and 
are rulers of themselves to whom God gives grace to seek their 
ultimate end, see ST 1|2.109.1 and SCG 3.1. 
43See, for example, ST 1.111.2 and DV 27.5. 
44Also see ST 1|2.55.1-3 and 56.4. 
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45For Aquinas's understanding of the theological virtue of love ex caritate as 
motivating the moral virtues, see, for example, ST 2|2.23-23025 and 
DC 3 and 7. 
46Also see ST 1|2.50.3 and 63.1. 
47Also see ST 1|2.55.1-3. 
48See his discussion in ST 1|2.68.3-4 on the gifts of the Holy Spirit as habits 
whereby the human is perfected to obey the Holy Spirit readily in 
comparison with the moral virtues that dispose the human to obey 
what reason dictates. 
49On the role of the virtues in relation to informed decision-making, see ST 
1|2.58.3, 62.1, 64.1, 66.3, 68.8, 100.1, 2|2.47.6 and 161.5. 
50Also see ST 1|2.58.4 and 2|2.47.7. 
51Also see ST 1|2.57.4-6, 2|2.47.2 and 8. 
52Also see ST 2|2.47.1-2 and 8. 
53Also see ST 1.22.1 where Aquinas discussed God’s providence as prudence 
by ordering all things in the universe to their ends which serves to 
underscore the need for humans to reason correctly by ordering all 
their actions toward their ultimate end in God. 
54Also see ST 2|2.47.9 and 1|2.57.6. 
55Any person who has the ability to reason is competent to have prudence in 
proportion to the person's rationality, he explained in ST 2|2.47.12. 
56This does not mean that Aquinas thought that the passions are evil. As 
stipulated in ST 2|2.141.6, they are good aspects of being human so 
long as they are controlled by the dictates of reason. See further ST 
2|2.141.1-5. 
57See SCG 3.132-133, ST 2|2.184.3-4, 7 and 186.3. Aquinas chose poverty 
as a way of life when joining the fledgling Dominican Order of 
Preachers and leaving behind his family’s relatively wealthy lifestyle, 
as Weisheipl (1974: 131) explained. 
58See, for example, SCG 3.64. 
59See also SCG 3.24 where he explains that the more perfect something is in 
its capabilities to act, the more it desires and acts for the common 
good. Creatures that are incapable of making informed decisions tend 
to seek their own individual good whereas the more perfect act for the 
good of their species, the even more perfect act for the good of their 
genus, and God, the most perfect, who acts for the good of the entire 
created world. 
60See further ST 2|2.123.11, 141.3, and 1|2.61.4. 
61For example, see John Paul II (1991: #59). 
62See also John Paul II (1987: #34) and (1989: #7-9). The Pope frames his 
concerns in the interests of human persons now and into the future 
and considers human labor as a participation in God’s creative activity 
(1991: #32 and 37; 1981: #25), which led some scholars to 
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characterize his model of the human person as a “co-creator”. For a 
constructive response to the Pope’s critics, see Vacek, (1990: 81-107). 
63See Vacek (1990: 81-107), essays in Houck and Williams (1983), and 
Pawlikowski (1998: 8-11). 
64See O'Neill et al. (1986: 30), King (1993: 19-46), and Allen and Starr 
(1982). 
65As Aquinas taught in ST 1.1.1 and scholars working in the burgeoning field 
of religion and science contend today, theology and the natural 
sciences do not conflict when they are practiced according to their 
distinct data, methods, purviews and limitations. Together they 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of issues at their 
boundaries that neither can address exclusively. See Barbour (1997: 
77-98), Haught (1994: 9-26), and John Paul II (1988). 
66At the time of writing, texts are not yet available from the conference on 
sustainability sponsored by the United Nations and held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa in late August to early September 2002 to 
check progress made since the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (1993) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June 1992 during 
which agreements were negotiated and enumerated under Agenda 21. 
An earlier international endeavor to define the term “sustainability” is 
the United Nations World Commission on Environment and 
Development (1987). 
67Conversely, the “steward” model suggests the need for humans to manage 
or take care of other species and ecological systems. 
68Leys (1995) provides an overview of the historical development of the 
principle of subsidiarity. Verstraeten (1998) explores this principle in 
relation to the notion of solidarity. 
69See essays in Raffensperger and Tickner (1999). 
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